War & Peace in a Dangerous
World
Notes on the Korean War (Continued)
A.
Chinese
Intervention
a.
Mao
had made the decision to intervene in October of 1950 after Mac-Arthur crossed
the 38th Parallel and invaded North Korea.
b.
PRC
forces had infiltrated the Taebeck Mountains separating the American 8th
Army from X Corps as the two American armies advanced toward the Yalu.
c.
At
Thanksgiving, 1950, 300,000 Chinese troops attacked across the Yalu River intent upon driving UN Forces from
North Korea and/or annihilating these forces
in place.
d.
Mao
believed that bravery and strategy could overcome a technologically superior
army.
e.
West
of the Taebecks, the American 8th Army was
in full retreat. It was a rout. Some American units were characterized by
their own cadre as having “Bug Out Fever.”
f.
East
of the Taebecks, Xth Corps,
most notably the 1st Marine Division fought a courageous withdrawal
in which they inflicted ten to one casualties on the Chinese Army while
evacuating the area with their wounded, their dead and their equipment.
B.
American
and United Nations Reaction to Chinese Intervention
a.
On
November 30th of 1950, Truman stated American purposes in Korea as follows: “We are fighting in Korea for our national security and
survival.” American commitment was
pledged to the establishment and maintenance of a just and peaceful world order
through the United Nations.
b.
Journalists
around the world began asking questions about the possible use of the atomic
bomb by American Forces in Korea.
c.
Truman
assured the world community, especially the British who were generally alarmed
at such a prospect, that the United States would not use nuclear weapons in Korea under any circumstances.
d.
The
Soviets under Josef Stalin believed the US had foresworn nuclear weapons for
fear of Soviet retaliation based upon the Treaty of Friendship between China and the Soviet Union.
e.
Telegrams
announcing KIAs, MIAs and POWs began to affect
American morale and support for the war on the homefront.
f.
Retreating
UN Forces followed a scorched earth policy leaving the landscape and cities of North Korea devastated. The North Korean Capitol of Pyongyang was
one-hundred percent destroyed.
g.
Seoul, South Korea fell once again to communist
forces at the beginning of 1951.
h.
General
Mac Arthur called for the bombing of Chinese cities and military installations
north of the Yalu.
He called for a naval blockade of the Chinese coast. He suggested a ground invasion of mainland China by hundreds of thousands of
Chinese Nationalist troops from Formosa.
He favored the use of nuclear weapons against as many as fifty targets
in China.
He envisioned a cobalt belt (radio active material) placed along the
Chinese, North Korean border to make the area uninhabitable. All of these suggestions were rejected by the
Truman Administration so Mac Arthur went public with his criticism of the
Administration’s War Policy.
i.
Truman
fired Mac Arthur because he felt the general’s criticism of administration
policy was causing doubt and confusion among Americans and UN allies
alike. Privately, Truman felt Mac Arthur
was guilty of gross insubordination.
Truman defended his Korean War Policy by stating the following:
i.
He
wanted to limit the war to the Korean Peninsular
ii.
He
wanted to limit the loss of lives, particularly those of UN soldiers.
iii.
He
wanted to preserve the security of the US and the Free World.
iv.
He
wanted to prevent World War III.
C.
Stalemate
and the Politics of Disengagement.
a.
The
air war, fought primarily in “Mig Alley” just south
of the Yalu River, was the first extensive use of
jet aircraft in combat and was dominated by American pilots flying the F86 Sabre Jet.
i.
While
the Soviet made Mig and the American Sabre Jet were roughly equivalent in terms of speed and
maneuverability American pilots were far better trained than their North Korean
and Chinese counterparts. Soviet pilots,
flying and fighting secretly, were a match for the American pilots but did not
participate in sufficient force to overcome the American advantage. Americans pilots such as Ted Williams and
John Glenn shot down Soviet Migs at a ratio of ten to
one.
ii.
While
dogfights in Mig Alley were important, American and
UN forces enjoyed air superiority on the Korean Peninsular. That advantage, coupled with American
advantages in artillery and naval gunfire, negated the Chinese numerical
superiority in ground forces and contributed substantially to the development
of a condition of stalemate in the area of the 38th Parallel.
b.
General
Matthew B. Ridgeway replaced General Mac Arthur as commander of UN combat
forces in Korea in April of 1951. He regained the initiative against communist
forces and recaptured the South Korean Capitol City of Seoul. However, the UN offensive ground to a halt in
the hills north of Seoul around the 38th
Parallel where the war had begun in June of 1950.
i.
General
Simmons, USMC, stated the obvious: “We were no longer fighting to win the war
but to reach some sort of political accommodation.”
ii.
Negotiations
to end the war began in the summer of 1951.
The main obstacle to reaching a settlement revolved around the issue of
treatment and repatriation of POWs held by both sides.
1.
One
in every three Americans captured by the North Koreans died in captivity. They were summarily executed or they starved
to death and many died of exposure and disease brought on by maltreatment.
2.
American
POWs captured by the Chinese Communists had a far greater chance of survival
than those taken by the North Koreans.
PRC forces used propaganda and brain washing techniques on American POWs
and often violated the Geneva Conventions by engaging in torture of
uncooperative prisoners.
3.
North
Korean and Chinese POWs who fell into the hands of ROK (South Korean units)
were treated brutally by their captors.
4.
American
and other UN forces treated their captured POWs far more humanely but there
were atrocities committed by all parties to the conflict.
5.
At
the end of the war approximately one-half of the 130,000 prisoners held by UN
forces refused repatriation to either North Korea or China.
6.
In
the final exchange 75,000 North Korean and Chinese prisoners were exchanged for
approximately 12,000 American and other UN POWs. There is some credible evidence that some
American POWs were transferred to the Soviet Union for their intelligence value and
never released.
D.
Summary
Comments on the Korean War
a.
Although
in excess of 500,000 Chinese troops were killed in the Korean War, Mao Zedong
called it a victory for the Peoples Republic of China.
His rationale was that China had demonstrated to the world that
it was no longer “The lame duck of Asia.”
b.
On
the home front in the United States the lives of most Americans
remained untouched. Korea can be termed “The Forgotten War”
even as it raged in the early fifties. Korean
War news rarely made the front pages of major US newspapers and television news
coverage was in its infancy.
c.
One
notable economic impact of the Korean War was that it revitalized the Japanese
economy. It generated three and a half
billion dollars in spending in Japan and turned that country into a
bastion of capitalism in the Far East and a vital American ally in the global struggle for
market dominance against what was perceived as an international
communist/socialist movement under Sino/Soviet leadership.
d.
In
terms of military scope and human suffering, American bombers dropped more
ordnance on the Korean Peninsular that they dropped upon Germany throughout World War II. More than two-million Korean civilians were
killed in the crossfire. “The dead were
everywhere. Cities, villages and the
Korean countryside were all bombed in the same way.” Terrible atrocities were visited upon victims
on both sides of the war. The North
Korean capitol city of Pyongyang was 100% destroyed. More than three millions Koreans, North and
South were killed, wounded or reported as missing. Five million Koreans were left homeless. The United States reported approximately 54,000
soldiers listed as killed or missing in action.
e.
The
war ended on July 27th of 1953 with the signing of a cease
fire/armistice but no formal peace treaty has ever been signed.
i.
The
death of Stalin in March of 1953 created a struggle for succession in the Soviet Union and the Russians put pressure on
the Chinese and North Koreans to put an end to military conflict with the
Americans in the face of this turmoil.
ii.
General
Dwight D. Eisenhower had pledged during his campaign for president in 1952 as
follows: “I shall go to Korea.”
The election of this famous American commander committed to ending the
war brought pressure on both sides to find accommodation.
1.
Back
channel, Eisenhower let it be known that failure to reach a ceasefire in place
might lead him to use nuclear weapons to force the Chinese and North Koreans to
surrender.
f.
At
the end of the war the boundary between North Korea and South Korea stood precisely where it had been
before June of 1950, at the 38th Parallel.
i.
There
was no absolute victory for either side but the United Nations forces, led by
the United States, had held the line against the
territorial expansion of communist forces.
Communism in the Far East had been contained.
ii.
Fifty
years later, with the Cold War consigned to its dubious place in history, the
Korean Peninsular remains divided and North Korea has been defined by President
George W. Bush as a dangerous component of “The Axis of Evil” which includes Iran and Iraq.
As such, North Korea remains a focal point in the
ongoing War on Terrorism and retains the potential to reignite hostilities in
the Far
East
which could lead to nuclear war with catastrophic consequences for the world
community.
